Introduction
Does a particular political regime promote economic growth? This is a longstanding question if either democracy or authoritarianism provides a more amicable environment for economic growth. That is because economic institutions, determined by political power of society, provide incentives for economic actors who invest in physical and human capital. Traditionally, democracy has been believed to be an essential prerequisite for long-run economic growth. Ardent advocates of democracy insist that work motivation, self improvement, efficient allocation of resources, and profit-maximizing activities all can be maintained only in the presence of liberty, free-flowing information, secured property rights and contract enforcement in the long term. On the other hands, economic institutions of the authoritarian state are more likely to introduce the top-down process, which creates unfavorable condition for credible commitment to investors that has a negative impact on economic growth.
However, researchers have still failed to reach consensus on how democracy influences economic growth. On the contrary, some empirical researches using historical data for last fifty years have illustrated that presents the methodology used. Empirical results and findings are discussed in Section IV and the last section concludes the paper.
Literature Review
Why do some countries succeed to be democratized? Structuralist perspectives have emphasized the societal precondition for democracy.
Economic development increases the demands for participation that lead to democracy, that is, a situation of relative political equality. 4) Sustained economic growth has been regarded as a democratic stimulus, 5) while economic wealth could be a main engine for maintaining the current regime whether democratic and authoritarian. 6) Olson argued:
"In an autocracy, the source of order and other public goods and likewise the source of the social progress that these public goods make possible is the encompassing interest of the autocrat. The main obstacle to long-run progress in autocracies is that individual rights even to such relatively unpolitical or economic matters as property and contracts can never be secure, at least over the long run. … On the other hand, democracies have the great advantage of preventing significant extraction of social surplus by their leaders. They also have the extraordinary virtue that the same emphasis on individual rights that is necessary to lasting democracy is also necessary for secure rights to both property and the enforcement of contracts. The moral appeal of democracy is now almost universally appreciated, but its economic advantages are scarcely understood." 7) 4) S. Haggard and R. R. Kaufman(1995) Surveys, 11, economies by influencing the structural reforms. However, the initial conditions will weaken over time and structural reform and stabilization policy become more important than the initial conditions. 21) In addition, structural reform should be subjected to public support, which is crucial for economic growth in transition economies. 22) However, stabilization and structural reforms are not always closely related with democracy because some authoritarian regime can control stabilization and structural reforms easier than some democratic government.
Ironically, economic growth rate of most authoritarian state of CIS has recorded more than four percentage points higher than that of Central inverse U-shaped non-linearity between democracy and growth, 26) however, the effect is no longer significant when extending the data set in time.
Empirical Model and Measurement

Model
To analyze the effect of democracy on economic growth, we employ three models for empirical analysis: Generalized Least Squares (GLS) fixed effects and random effects regression, and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with Panel
Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE).
To estimate the effect of democracy on economic growth, the following multi-regression model is used:
where y is an indicator of economic growth, D is the degree of democracy, X is a vector of control variables, and ε is a random disturbance.
An important characteristic of panel data is that we cannot assume that the observations are independently distributed across time. Therefore, these panel data enable us to control for unobserved heterogeneity such as cultural factors or difference in political practices across countries. In addition, panel data have been reduced the possible problem of collinearity among independent variables, and can be calculated more precise estimates due to the efficiency gain brought by more data. The fixed effect model and the random model are variants of GLS. Fixed-effects model is designed to study the causes of changes within the country 27) and provides us analyzing the influence of democracy that change over time. As Stock and Watson put it:
the key insight is that if the unobserved variable does not change over time, then any changes in the dependent variable must be due to influences other than these fixed characteristics. 28) That is, fixed model assumes that a time-invariant characteristic cannot cause such a change, because it is constant for each country.
Unlike in the fixed effects model, the variation across countries is assumed to be random and uncorrelated with democracy in the random model. The difference between two models is that every other country in fixed effects model has its own intercept, while each intercept interpreted as the result of a random deviation from some mean intercept in the random effect model.
Correlation between the unobserved effects and the explanatory variables have been assumed to be zero in random effects model. However, in many cases it would be non-zero. This implies inconsistency due to omitted variables in the random effect model. Fixed effect model is inefficient, but consistent.
Thus we employ both of two models.
GLS fixed-and random-effects model, which incorporates information about the errors and thereby makes up for the inefficiency of OLS, is the best linear unbiased estimator and will give correct standard errors. However, GLS assumes that the variance-covariance matrix is known when in practice it is not.
Secondly, we applied PCSEs, which are commonly used when working with time-series, cross-sectional data, as proposed by Beck and Katz. 29) 27) U. Kohler and F. Kreuter(2008) PCSEs are better because they take advantage of the information provided by the panel structure of the data and produce more reliable standard errors. A crucial assumption for the method of PCSEs is that the errors are free of serial correlation. PCSEs can make the researcher be more conservative about their inferences.
Measurement
Worldwide and Estimating Time-Series-Cross-Section Models," Political Analysis, 6, pp. 1-36.
30) The first 'Voice and Accountability(VA)' mean the capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. The second 'Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism(PV)' -capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. The first two criteria evaluate the process by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced. The two criteria of the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies include 'Government Effectiveness(GE),' which measures capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. And 'Regulatory Quality(RQ)' indicates the extent of capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. The data are all generated from the World Bank. 
Findings
We tested panel data models, more specifically random effects models and fixed effects models. Table 3 presents the results from the estimation using a estimator, PCSE. It also includes the results from GLS random-effects and fixed effects regression. In its final analysis, OLS with PCSE is chosen to avoid overconfidence, which either panel-heteroscedasticity or contemporaneous correlation may cause. (ii) The coefficients on the intercepts are not reported. *Statistical significance at the 10%. **Idem., 5%, ***Idem., 1%.
Results of random and fixed effect model, even more unequivocally than the OLS with PCSE results, show a negative significant effect of democracy on growth. The random effect point estimates are larger than the OLS with PCSE point estimates, and, interestingly, institutional variables are related to economic growth. According to the random effect results, there is little reason to doubt that democracy, as measured by WGI, decreases economic growth rates. This could be indicated by different results from the previous empirical studies, in which democracy operated by Freedom House Index and EBRD Liberalization Index, argues that democracy produces an increase in growth rates. 33) However, the assumptions underlying random effect are most likely not satisfied if the country specific effects are highly correlated with certain independent variables, thus random effects are not suitable for the analysis.
Instead of random effects, we use fixed effects. addition to contemporary regime status." 36) Using long-term democracy level and democracy stocks as descriptive statistics, they analysed the relationship of democracy to economic growth. Their two conclusions have important implication for the research of the same subject in Post-Communist transition countries. "First, the relationship to growth is stronger when democracy is considered as a cumulative concept, rather than a continuous concept. … Second, … both the degree and the duration or democratic experience matter when one considers the effect of democracy on growth." 37) Another possible explanation of above results has taken from the ideas of Acemoglu and his colleagues who argue against the validity of this basic empirical result. 38) They suggest that previous studies testing the relationship between development and democracy contain some fundamental flaws. In particular, they point out that existing studies, which are based on cross-country relationships, do not control for potential bias induced by omitted variables. They provide evidence for the importance of historic institutions for current economic development.
Conclusion
This article explores a persistent variation in the effect of democracy on economic growth in Post-Communist transition countries. By drawing extensive dataset and applying various statistical models, one salient feature of preliminary due to the relatively short period of transition about 20 years.
Moreover, this paper uses only institution-related variables to determine income per capita. This methodology could lead to omitted variable bias. In addition, we assume that democracy affects income per capita not vice versa.
In detail, some countries like Poland or Czechoslovakia began macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms earlier, while in other -mostly CIS including Russia -later. In this regard, timing could influence the nature of transitional reform process and to some extent late abandonment of socialist system made it more painful. Besides, the length of period during which a particular country was brought under socialism should be taken into 
